Two Historical Records of the Kingdom of Vientiane

In this chapter, I would like to present a description and analysis of two apparently unstudied historical documents, one illustrating early Lao influence in what is now the Thai Isan, and the other about Samneua, in the northeast near the border with Vietnam. They are both from the reign of Chao Anou.\(^1\) I found these documents among the old historical and literary records in Wat Phra Kaao in Vientiane in 1966, when I was living there, teaching English, and studying Lao history and language.\(^2\) Not only are they records of areas which have been neglected by historians, and in the case of the second still little known, but they also bear direct evidence on one question that has preoccupied western historians of Southeast Asia – whether the political economy of early Southeast Asia resulted in rulers being more concerned with control of land or control of people. Unfortunately, as I shall demonstrate below, both sides of this discussion have offered *ad hoc*, case-by-case *pronunciamientos*, which are then repeated like *mantra*, without attention to what the sources really show, or to the contradictions which ensue. Critical discussion of the question is long overdue; and I hereby take the opportunity to launch it in connection with the Vientiane documents, which provide clear evidence in one direction for one area of mainland Southeast Asia.

**Land or People?**

The conventional wisdom is that ‘the concept of national boundaries […] did not exist in Southeast Asia […] Southeast Asians were not much concerned with the demarcation of frontiers’;\(^3\) and close to the area of interest here: ‘The boundary of the kingdom, or of a province, was always left vague, while the population of the kingdom, or a town […] were the main concern of the Thais’.\(^4\) Some expositions of this doctrine


2. I wish to take this occasion to acknowledge the help of my friend and teacher, Maha Khammay Singkietthiphong, then with the Lao Literature Committee, in my first readings of these documents in 1966–1967.


4. Akin Rabibhadana, *The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782–1873*, Ithaca: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper 74,
which has acquired mantra quality, are the following.

Charnvit Kasetsiri, in his *The Rise of Ayudhya*, wrote that:

[Throughout the history of mainland South-East Asia manpower has always been a major problem. The land area has been very large but the population to maintain a wet-rice economy has been small. Therefore, the socio-economic system of the low river-valleys tended to welcome a large influx of population. In short, the old kingdoms of the lowlands, whether Mon or Khmer, probably were more hospitable to the new people. Thus their economic system created a situation in which the Thai could move south and settle in the lowlands of the Menam Basin.]

This implies two things: 1) that the lowlands populated by Mon and Khmer, before the arrival of the Thai, operated a commercial rice-production economy, presumably for export, (a view which, I believe, is not held by any historian), for the ratio of population to land is irrelevant if rice is grown only for subsistence, provided only that there is enough land to feed the existing population; 2) that the Thai, before they moved into the lowland river valleys, were relatively overpopulated in relation to land, which is the opposite of the mantra, and is also demographically illogical, for the lowland areas, with ample fertile land, were more likely to have had faster growing populations. At most it says that some polities may have been land hungry, while others were not. In any case, the examples evoked by Charnvit are infelicitous.

Moreover, earlier in the same work, Charnvit had written that ‘the central region of the kingdom of Dvaravati was […] economically important’, with rich soil from several rivers, Menam, Mekong, Suphanburi, Lophburi, Pasak. He adds that because it was ‘[c]riss-crossed by these natural river-lines, no very great human effort was necessary to turn the region into a major producer of rice’. Thus this area would not have been seeking to artificially increase its population. On the contrary: ‘As production developed, it required and provided the means of subsistence for a considerable body of manpower [meaning that with easy food production population would have naturally increased]. It is noticeable that when the empire of Angkor reached the height of its power, it repeatedly tried to control this area to absorb its reserves of manpower […]’.

First, this central region of Dvaravati was the same area which Charnvit in the context cited above had said was lacking in population and therefore open to immigration, and this statement contradicts Charnvit’s other view of the Menam basin as short of population in comparison with available land. Secondly, there is no evidence for this type of Angkor interest in the Menam basin.

The history of Angkor-lower Menam basin relations is anything but clear. However, there is certainly no clear evidence that Angkorean expansion westward was designed to acquire control over manpower. Since Angkor had the same type of economy as the Menam basin, its man-land relationship would have been similar. Angkor influence, both cultural and political, did expand into the Menam Basin, especially in the 11–12th centuries (most clearly in the reigns of Suryavarman I [1002–1050], Suryavarman II [1113?–1145/50?], and Jayavarman VII [1181–1220?]); but the economic aspect was more likely to have been acquisition of valuable produce more

1969, p. 77.


than people, and control over the ports on the Gulf of Thailand. The latter two of those kings tried to impose Cambodian control over the coast of Champa and invaded Vietnam. Jayavarman had roads constructed from Angkor into Champa, central and northeast Thailand and Laos, at the same time opening new relations with China. All of this occurred, when the Sung were encouraging new developments in maritime trade between China and Southeast Asia. One must hypothesize that the Cambodian initiatives, in the 12th century especially, were connected with the new Chinese policies. The evidence is even stronger in the 14th and 15th centuries, when there are more Chinese records of contact with Cambodia than during the previous five hundred years.7

Charnvit continued, ‘both Ayudhya and Bangkok were able to stabilize their power only because of their secure control over this centre of rice production’. This is not at all certain. The most recent studies of the area suggest that both Ayutthaya and Bangkok developed and prospered as international maritime trading polities, not as states based on control of agricultural land, and not, until the 19th century, with primary emphasis on export of rice.8 And when Charnvit further argues that, compared to ‘Chiengmai and Sukhothai, both of which found eventually that they could not feed their populations from their own agricultural resources, and so lost military ascendancy’, he is in fact acknowledging that some important Southeast Asian polities were land-hungry (and abstracting entirely from the historical validity of the statement).

Thus the problem for the northern kingdoms may have been lack of land. It is not at all certain that Angkor desired manpower in central Thailand, rather than simply control over the rich agricultural resources. It is also noteworthy that the legends of the founding of Ayutthaya, whatever their value as history, imply a search for land, not for people.9

9. Every element of those legends (several versions cited by Charnvit) of the founding of Ayutthaya is wrong, according to current historical and pre-historical evidence.
In a similar vein, Akin Rabibhadana wrote as follows:

One particular characteristic of the historical Southeast Asian mainland states was the lack of manpower. The need for manpower is well illustrated by events following each war between Thailand and her neighbours. The victorious side always carried off a large number of people from the conquered territory. Whole villages were often moved into the territory of the conqueror, where they were assimilated and became the population of the conqueror. The Thai seem to have been especially aware of the importance of having a large population. The famous inscription of the early Thai King Ram Khamhaeng could be interpreted as an advertisement inducing people to come and settle in the Sukhothai kingdom.  

Akin commented further that La Loubère said ‘the people developed only half the plain into rice fields, and commented that the size of the population was not commensurate with the size of the country’. As noted above, this situation would only be relevant to the mantra in an economy attempting to expand rice production for export, which was not the case in the 1680s, when export of rice was generally prohibited. Interestingly, Akin contradicts Charnvit’s view of the reasons for the eventual weakness of the North compared to Ayutthaya: ‘From existing evidence, the history of Thai society can be traced back to the early thirteenth century when Thai chiefs attacked and defeated the Khmer commander of Sukhothai […] which became powerful during the latter half of the century’. But ‘the dominant position of Sukhothai did not last long, for within the next century her power was eclipsed by another Thai center, Ayutthaya’. Continuing: ‘It appears that the main problem of establishing a viable kingdom in this area [Sukhothai] was the control of manpower. The area was under-populated, and the movement of people was extremely difficult to control’. Before attempting to theorise this problem, some agreement on basic facts is required. Was Sukhothai under-populated, or short of land?

Another example of the mantra quality is the blatantly contradictory treatment of this subject by David Wyatt: ‘As much as anything else, the Tai müang was an instrument for the efficient use of manpower in a region where land was plentiful in relation to labor and agricultural technology’. And Wyatt continues with the Thai elite view of class relations, saying that patron-client relationship was not too one-sided, ‘Pushed to a confrontation, the chao could rely upon superior force, but the village farmer could resort to flight to the surrounding wilderness or to a neighboring müang


eager to gain his labor’.  

The contradiction, however, starts on the following page: ‘During the first millennium of the Christian Era, the population of the Tai communities of upland, interior Southeast Asia apparently steadily increased. Under the prevailing ecological and political conditions, it was natural that there should have been a slow expansion of this population in a western and southwestern direction’.  

Thus for those communities it was land-hunger, not desire for more labour.

As Wyatt continues:

The early chronicles of Tai groups […] are filled with stories of demographic and political movement and expansion. The patterns of movement they depict are remarkably consistent. Characteristically, a ruler would gather together the men of his müang and form them into a military expedition, usually under the leadership of one of his sons. They would conquer, or simply colonize, a distant region and settle it with families from the parent müang, who would ‘turn the forest into rice-fields’ and settle in organized communities ruled by the young prince. The ruler might organize such campaigns for a whole succession of his sons, giving each a principality of his own to rule while enhancing the power of the parent müang […]. In northern Vietnam and Laos, where this movement must have occurred, the mountain valleys suitable for rice cultivation are extremely small and narrow, and are separated by difficult, mountainous territory. Thus the demographic and political center of gravity of the Tai population could have moved fairly rapidly.

Even more evidence of land hunger is presented by Wyatt who states that ‘[a]s late as the end of the twelfth century, no regional Tai states had yet emerged to dominate their neighbors […] none of the Tai müang had yet descended to the great plains that alone would support the expansion and enrichment of a population to the point where it could form the basis of a major kingdom on the scale of Angkor or Pagan’.  

Although on the same page Wyatt compounds contradictions with, ‘What local Tai chieftains and princes had in these areas was control over manpower, which was always in short supply throughout Southeast Asia. Their ability to mobilize a population was both a danger to the major empires and a source of potential strength to them’.

We might note here, that the Lao legend of Khun Borom sending out sons to take possession of new territories, implies conquest of territory, not acquisition of people to work on surplus land.

Studies of another thickly populated part of Southeast Asia, Java, also show evidence contrary to the mantra. In the second half of the 17th century, Tegal Wangi, Susuhunan of Mataram (1646–1677), sent groups of people to settle his western frontier. The central Java border was along the Ci-Tarum River 300 km west. Some people from Ayah settled in Krawang, some from Banyumas settled at Tanjung Pura, and people from Cirebon settled at Ci-Anjur. These are examples of surplus population looking for more land. In the 1660s, an inscription in Krawang records the collection of surplus rice to send to the Susuhunan in Central Java; and the Dutch confirmed that Mataram people were moving into the wet-rice area of Krawang in 1620–1650. These

migrations infiltrated Javanese into a Sundanese area.\(^\text{17}\) (A ‘beach-head’, as in Kachorn Sukhabanich’s ‘Beach-head States’?). In West Java, at the time, rice cultivation was not usually wet-rice, but dry fields of *gaga* or *tipar* types;\(^\text{18}\) and the Central Java people brought wet-rice cultivation which may have resulted in a kind of land colonisation (thus surplus people searching for more land).

Of course, there is no doubt that after some wars the victors forcibly took away large numbers of the defeated population; however, was it for the purpose of putting them to work productively on surplus land in the possession of the victors? On one 19th-century occasion witnessed by European diplomatic staff, the brutal resettlement in 1876 of 6,000 Phuan from Lao to Thai territory, the death toll suggests that the purpose was to weaken the defeated territory, not, first of all, to acquire new workers.\(^\text{19}\)

Other mantra treatments are in the works of Michael Aung Thwin.\(^\text{20}\) In one context


Aung-Thwin wrote:
One of the main themes in early Southeast Asian history has been the struggle for, and effective organization of, labour. Since land was plentiful, the key to economic growth and political power was the effective control of human resources. Much of the warfare of early Southeast Asia witnessed the victor carrying off half the population of the vanquished foe and later resettling them on his own soil.” Pagan was located in the dry belt of Burma, and “depended mainly upon irrigated agriculture for its economic base. Land was plentiful but labor was extremely difficult to obtain.”

There is a contradiction in economic logic here. Irrigation for agriculture is necessary when population outgrows land available to supply sufficient food using more primitive methods. Development of irrigation implies that the population is outgrowing land under given conditions. As Aung Thwin continues: “In the eleventh century, Aniruddha provided the kingdom with additional labor from Thaton in lower Burma and began the process of centralization”. He brought the Buddhist sangha from Thaton and ‘aristocracy, artisans, and other miscellaneous persons’. Here, however, Aung Thwin has misused his sources, which do not record large-scale population transfer, but only small groups of specialists, none of them agricultural.

According to this tale, Shin Arahan told Anuruddha that the Tripitaka, and many relics, were in Thaton. Anuruddha requested a set but the king of Thaton refused. After the conquest Anuruddha took the relics, the scriptures, King Manuha and his family; and ‘mighty men of valor’; and ‘thereafter he sent away separately, without mixing, such men as were skilled in carving, turning [...]. When Anuruddha reached Pagan he ‘made separate quarters for the mighty men of valor to dwell in, and the host of learned men whom he had brought’. The people he took were all sorts of craftsmen, skilled workers, with no mention of agriculturists.

In another work, Aung Thwin wrote that many asan [a population category] were Mon, explaining that ‘this relationship may have stemmed from Aniruddha’s conquest in the mid-eleventh century of the Mon kingdom of Thaton in Lower Burma, when he brought back with him the bulk of the Mon population, including large numbers of the artisan class’. Aung Thwin fudges again. No source says he brought back ‘the bulk of

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23. Pe Maung Tin and G.H. Luce (transl.), Glass Palace Chronicle, pp. 77–79. Note that this chronicle was compiled in 1829, ‘sifted and prepared in accordance with all credible records in the books’ (p. ix).
the Mon population’. 24 This exaggeration had already appeared in Aung Thwin’s thesis, where he wrote that Pagan was in the dry belt, and ‘depended mainly upon irrigated land for its economic base. Land was plentiful at first, but labor was difficult to procure. In the 11th century, King Aniruddha […] provided the Kingdom with this needed additional labor by sacking coastal Thaton in Lower Burma and importing most of its productive classes – the artisans as well as the Buddhist clergy along with the whole royal family – into Pagan, precisely what Nanchao had done to the Pyus earlier.’ 25 Again, it is important to realize that need for irrigation implies a population running out of land, the reverse of Aung-Thwin’s argument.

As for what Anuruddha did or did not do in Thaton, the Mon chronicle, in Halliday’s translation reports that ‘[…] Noratha […] came marching down from Pagan […] the design of digging up the relics’. He failed and he made gold and silver umbrellas to offer to the relics. 26 Not only is Mon tradition contrary to the type of conquest related in the Burmese chronicles, but the story has a definitely legendary character. There is no date for this passage, and it follows a section about Asoka, ‘in the time of King Tatabong and Mancesu’.

Still another interpretation by Aung Thwin is somewhat different from all of the above: ‘After securing his front – which bordered the kingdom of Nanchao [modern Yunnan] – with stockades he [Aniruddha] attacked his rear (Thaton), imported skilled and unskilled labor, and instituted a hierarchically structured Buddhist church’; but, ‘Justifying his attack as Dharmavijaya or righteous conquest, Aniruddha left Thaton more or less intact [sic, thus, no ‘sacking coastal Thaton’, as above], neither settling on it nor directly incorporating the port city into the Pagan administrative apparatus. Rather, Thaton was left as a neutral port with access to the outside world’. 27

In his latest work Aung-Thwin’s thought has evolved still further in the direction of the position I maintain here. ‘The conquest of Thaton by Aniruddha in 1057 was an attempt by agrarian Upper Burma to exert its control over and acquire the revenues [emphasis added] of coastal Burma, not a Burmese conquest of Mon peoples. It was justified in religious terms, legitimized as dharmavijaya (righteous conquest) in order to obtain holy relics […]’. 28 It must be emphasized that no chronicle records the importation of unskilled labour from Thaton to Pagan, only skilled artisans.

Of course, as usual, those obstreperous Vietnamese were different. Not only did they win wars they were not supposed to win, but their history, both in popular and academic treatments, required a different mantra. It was a constant movement of people southward (nám tiến) in search of fertile rice land. As Nayan Chanda quoted Paul Mus, they ‘flowed across Indochina like a flood carrying off other peoples wherever they occupied lowland rice field[s] or where it could be put under rice’. For many years Michael Cotter’s treatment of ‘the Vietnamese Southward Movement’ was the standard. 29 Until very recently, when there has been progress among Vietnam

specialists, no historian took up the challenge to resolve these conflicting mantra about the political economy of ancient Southeast Asia.

A careful look at a physical map should have inspired doubt about this special mantra for Vietnam, which illustrates even better than the general Southeast Asian mantra how a mantra may get a grip on even the best scholars, for Mus, at least, had not only seen the maps, but knew the terrain thoroughly from personal investigation. South of the Red River plain, the area of land suitable for rice in former Champa is very limited, a narrow strip between sea and mountains, with small deltas at river mouths. The Vietnamese conquest of Champa was certainly not for the purpose of acquiring new rice land for a surplus population in the North.

Difficulty in overcoming the mantra is seen even in the work of new Vietnam specialists who go beyond Cotter’s simplistic treatment. Li Tana, for example, who has emphasized the strategic and non-agricultural economic reasons for the Vietnamese move southward, still felt constrained, perhaps under pressure of the academic environment in which she was working at the time, to write that ‘the later pattern of southern expansion was shaped by the physical objective of occupying land’, but ‘early episodes […] were aimed instead at seizing people and treasure, a typical pattern in Southeast Asia warfare’. For this, however, she provided only the examples of 100 Cham ladies seized in 982, and 360 Cham prisoners released in 992, hardly in line with the mantra about seizing population to work empty land. This no doubt accounts for her almost surreptitious modification of the mantra to ‘seizing people and treasure’. Obviously uncomfortable with this nod to conventional wisdom, Li Tana continued with the example of Ho Quy Ly, ‘who pressed rich but landless Vietnamese to migrate’ to land conquered from the Cham, adding that when the Nguyen forcibly moved people, they ‘were especially concerned to increase the number of their Vietnamese subjects […] the principal source of military conscripts’, which was ‘unorthodox behavior’ in terms of Southeast Asian warfare in which population was taken due to ‘low population and abundant land’.30

First, the very concept of a steady Vietnamese Drang nach Süden (nâng tiến) requires rethinking. It was not steady, and its stages show that there was no continuing policy of southward expansion. Each move was ad hoc, in response to particular challenges, as Li Tana put it: ‘a series of different episodes responding to particular events or opportunities’.31 The first war between independent Vietnam and Champa broke out when the Cham king agreed to aid a Vietnamese rebel in an attempt to

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30. Li Tana, *Nguyen Cochinchina, Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, pp. 19, 21, 28. I wish to thank Paul Kratoska for bringing me up to date on some of the new work on Vietnam, which I had ignored during several years of exclusive preoccupation with Cambodia.

overthrow the reigning Vietnamese king. The plot failed, and Champa suffered.

Many other conflicts were started by the Cham, and in the period 1360–1390, under a
notable warrior-prince, Che [a Cham princely title] Bong Nga, the Cham ravaged the
North for years, and nearly conquered Vietnam, but after their failure were forced to
give several northern Cham provinces to Vietnam. The complexity of relations between
the two peoples is seen in the appointment of Che Bong Nga’s son to govern those
provinces for Vietnam, which he did forcefully, to the extent of fighting off other Cham
from the South who tried to re-conquer them.

Now one of the leading historians of Vietnam states bluntly that ‘I do not believe
that such an event [nam tiến] ever took place’, and, like Li Tana, he writes in more
detail of a series of episodes. Moreover, ‘rather than southward expansion of the
Vietnamese people, the archive [sic] suggests the formation of new ways to act
Vietnamese in terrain previously inhabited by speakers of Cham and other languages’,
where ‘some families who now identify themselves as Vietnamese trace their ancestry
to Cham speakers’.

Mus noted the high level of Cham rice technology, which had no doubt developed
because of the scarcity of good land, and the fact that the Vietnamese ‘conquerors did
even put back into service all of the clever irrigation systems of the conquered’. And as Li Tana has noted, ‘the weak agricultural base […] could hardly sustain a
desperate struggle with […] the Trinh north’; and in Đang Trong the Vietnamese
encountered land that was thick with grass and hard to farm’, which forced them to
adapt the Cham plough, for which they still use some of the Cham terminology. Or
perhaps they are Vietnamised Cham, as Taylor suggests.

Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 14, no. 1, 1983, pp. 46–62, see in particular p. 59; Jean
Boisselier, La statuaire du Champa, Paris: Publications de l’École Française
34. Keith W. Taylor, ‘Surface Orientations in Vietnam: Beyond Histories of Nation and
in particular). Taylor’s irritating use of ‘the archive’ in this article, and in fact the
entire first six pages, seem to be part of an effort to adopt the mannerisms of post-
modernist cultural studies, a tendency which does not inspire confidence in the
resulting historical conclusions.
35. Mus, Sociologie, p. 19, apparently not perceiving that this contradicted his
statement on p. 17, quoted above, and which misled later popularizers; Li Tana, ‘An
Alternative Vietnam? The Nguyễn Kingdom in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
(pp. 117–118 in particular). Đang Trong was Nguyễn Cochinchina, called Annam
by the French, now central Vietnam.
The *nam tiến* seems to be definitely out of favour. Nevertheless, the secular result of the episodes which, according to Li Tana and Keith Taylor, were mistaken for a *nam tiến* was the spread of Vietnamese language, rule by Vietnamese, and to some extent a southward movement of one group of Vietnamese leaders with their supporting population. Neither of the *mantra* can account for it. Is there a materialist explanation? Taylor shies away from anything like that, but Li Tana states it emphatically and, I think, correctly.\(^{36}\)

A close look at the map, and some attention to the history of pre-Vietnamese Champa, should have suggested that if there was something which the Vietnamese desired in Champa, apart from responding to Cham provocations, it was the Cham ports, important in the international trade of the time, and their access to upland areas with the

valuable products supplying that trade. That was probably also the reason for the Cambodian conquests in Champa in the reigns of the Angkor kings Suryavarman II (1113–1150?) and Jayavarman VII (1181–1220?) – conquest and occupation, which may have done more to destabilize Champa than the wars with Vietnam. The Angkor Cambodians, at least, were not searching for rice land, nor is there any sign that they tried to transport a Cham population to increase their own agricultural labor force.

When, finally, the wars between Vietnam and the Cham polities had led to Vietnamese occupation of all of what is now central Vietnam, and the establishment of a new Vietnamese political center there, the Nguyen kingdom developed, as should be expected from the geography, as a centre of maritime trade, in conflict with the North.

As Li Tana put it, ‘Dang Trong’s difficult terrain meant that the navy was a vital component of the Nguyen armed forces’; ‘Overseas trade was the engine driving Dang Trong’s spectacular development […] the crucial factor explaining how this thinly populated land was able to resist’; ‘Maritime trade was no doubt a most important stimulus to Nguyen state formation’; ‘Economic factors played a decisive role’ in the formation of Nguyen-Díng Trong, and ‘Perhaps the most important characteristic which made the new southern Vietnamese different from Vietnamese in the north was their attitude towards overseas trade. Dang Trong was born in an age of ‘commerce’; Nguyen

37. There seems to be little documentation on the ports of Champa until after they came under Vietnamese domination and began to be visited by Portuguese in the 16th century. Nevertheless, the Cham were one of the Austronesian-speaking peoples who spread from the Marquesas to Madagascar by sea, and themselves reached the mainland coast from Indonesia. Most of the extant Cham temple sites are near the mouths of large rivers; and the Portuguese testified to the importance of the ports, such as Tourane/Dà Nang, known also to the Portuguese as ke [town] cham; Faifo/hoi An, or Pullu [island] Ciambello/Cù-lao Chàm; Quang Ngai; Qui Nho’n, formerly ‘the port of the Cham capital Vijaya’ and ‘the most commercially active port of Champa’; Nha Trang, ‘certainly an important Cham center’; Camranh, where, when it was described in a Portuguese routier in the 16th century, the ‘agglomeration of warships’ observed ‘could not have been anything but Cham’; Phan Rang or Pandeirao (Cham Pandaran, ancient Panduranga), also called Port du Champa, from which ebony was exported; and Phan Thiet. One of the most valuable products for which Champa was noted was ‘eaglewood’ or calambac, the procurement of which even into Nguyen times was a prerogative of Cham and Roglai, with the best quality coming from the hinterland of Phanrang. See: Pierre-Yves Manguin, Les Portugais sur les côtes du Viet-Nam et du Campa, Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1972, pp. 163–168, 244–248; and Li Tana, Nguyên Cochinchina, p. 124.
power ‘rested on this overseas trade [….] [b]y following the Cham example […].’

Taylor also, while trying, as noted above, to avoid a materialist explanation, could not avoid the facts. Nguyễn Hoàng ‘established the direct presence of his family in Quang Nam in 1602, shortly after [emphasis added] his final fateful departure from the north’, and ‘he placed his most competent son in command’, which ‘reveals the importance he attached to the place […] more prosperous that Thuan Hóa’, and ‘surely the presence of foreign merchants was not unconnected with this’. The evidence forces Taylor to a conclusion which he finds ‘curious’: ‘the port of Faifo was a prosperous international entrepôt for half a century before Nguyễn Hoàng established a direct administrative presence in its vicinity’, and even before he did that, he ‘surely took an interest in the place and sent officers to supervise it’, for the sake of ‘order, security, and profit [emphasis added]’. Taylor chooses to emphasize that Nguyễn Hoàng *did not go beyond* [emphasis added] those concerns, that is he did not reside there. However, I think there is ample evidence to conclude that that particular phase of a Vietnamese *nam tiến* was impelled, not by a search for agricultural land on which to settle surplus people, but by the attraction of a mercantile coast which had already prospered under the Cham.

Even when they came in contact with Cambodia, it was not Cambodia’s rice land which was the first attraction. The first Nguyen demand on Cambodia was neither land nor people, but war elephants. As in the territory already conquered from the Cham, the Nguyen, once they gained control of the *potentially* rich rice land of the Cambodian South (French colonial Cochinchina, Khmer *Kampuchea krom*) in the 18th century, they did little to develop it, a task which fell upon the French. It was only then that the Mekong Delta plain became a rice granary which could attract massive Vietnamese peasant immigration.

Whether *mantra* or not, and noting that political-economic relationships in different societies may have been different, the problem of labour in relation to land was not peculiar to Southeast Asia; but was familiar in Western Europe as well. As Marc Bloch wrote of Europe:

> At that time when land was more abundant than man, when, besides, economic


41. Li Tana, *Nguyễn Cochinchina*, p. 30, the Mekong delta ‘did not become populous with Vietnamese before Nguyễn Anh [Emperor Gia Long 1802–20] went there in the late eighteenth century’.
conditions prevented the exploitation of too large areas with wage or domestic labor, it was worth more to dispose of a permanent supply of labor and dependents than to stitch together parcel after parcel of land. [And], Certainly the seigneurs sought to keep their peasants. Without people, what value did land have? But it was difficult to prevent departures, because the dispersal of authority worked, more than ever, against any effective police constraint, and besides, since virgin land was still very plentiful, it was hardly worth while to threaten the fugitive with confiscation, for he was almost certain to find another establishment elsewhere.\textsuperscript{42}

Of course, Bloch was writing of political economic conditions quite different from those prevailing in Southeast Asia. In feudal Europe the lords were private land owners who required extra labour beyond their own families to cultivate a surplus giving them a luxurious lifestyle, and eventually to sell on a growing market. It was not just impractical for the individual lord to try to ‘stitch together’ parcels of land, it would have meant encroaching on land [even though perhaps in fact ‘virgin land’] of another lord, or the sovereign.

Thus, the problem of land or people with which I opened this section was not peculiar to Southeast Asia or to its historiography. It arises in any agrarian mode of production in which the surplus desired by those who can claim it is to be produced by the application of labour to land. The Champa-Vietnam case may now be seen as outside both of the \textit{mantra}, and I suspect that when the requisite close reading has been performed, some of the Thai cases may serve to explode their conventional \textit{mantra}, as do the Lao documents discussed below.

\textbf{The Lao Documents: A Contribution to De-mantrafication}

The two Lao documents presented here do not support the conventional wisdom concerning Southeast Asia exclusive of Vietnam. Both of them delimit boundaries in great detail, and give much more emphasis to descriptions of territory than to enumeration or control of the population within it. One of them, the Phu Khiao text, moreover, is outside of both \textit{mantra} in the importance it gives to acquisition of that territory as a source of valuable natural products desired by the kings of Vientiane. The Samneua document, in its very detailed geographic and administrative description, is closer to the conventional Vietnam \textit{mantra} than to that imputed to Thai areas, and it seems to reflect the influence of Vietnamese cadastral and census practices.

What is offered here is a preliminary description and commentary to indicate the historical interest of these two texts. A full study will require more detailed comparison with the better-known histories of the Lao kingdoms, Bangkok, Thonburi, and late Ayutthaya, perhaps a task which will attract someone among the new generation of Lao scholars and encourage investigation of the records extant within Laos, first of all in the library of Wat Phra Kaeo in Vientiane.

The first of the two chronicles is a palm leaf manuscript entitled Phongsawadan Phu Kiao, which was catalogued as Palm leaf manuscript no. 36, Hanoi Collection, indicating that it had been part of the collection of the École Française d’Extrême-Orient kept in Hanoi and returned to Laos in the 1950s. Neither its language nor script presents great difficulty, being 19th century precursors of what is now standard Vientiane Lao. Its author, source, and place of composition are unknown, but the incorporation of local folk tradition indicates composition in the Isan, probably in Phu Khiao itself, and internal evidence, discussed below, indicates a date after 1848 and before the reign of King Mongkut (1851–1868).

Phu Khiao is at present a district in Chaiyaphum Province and on a direct east-west line between the provincial capitals of Khon Kaen and Phetchabun, 75 km from the

43. Louis Finot, ‘Recherches sur la littérature laotienne’, Bulletin d’École Française d’Extrême-Orient, vol. xvii, no. 5, 1917, list of manuscripts, pp. 177–218. I have not been able to determine the exact date of their return.

44. Note that the term phu ‘mountain’ in the name Phu Khiao, and in other toponyms in this text, is consistently written with the initial consonant known in Thai as pho phan (ผ), rather than pho samphao (พ) as in modern standard Thai. In fact, the Lao spelling is historically correct, and the Thai variant suggests a spurious etymology, or hypercorrection, perhaps influenced by Sanskrit ‘earth, world’.
In the early 19th century it apparently had some political or administrative importance, even though few extant records give it much attention, for the French missionary Pallegoix had heard that Phu Khiao and Suwannaphum were the two most important among ‘five or six small [Isan] states governed by princes who pay tribute to Siam’. Its story is as follows:

According to the story handed down from one generation to the next, Mueang Phu Khiao was for a long time a forest. It belonged to the king. There was a man named Nai Ma who lived in Ban Kaluem, Mueang Phan, Khwaeng Mueang Vientiane. He was a hunter. He always went looking for horns, tusks, and forest products in the forest of Phu Khiao. Finally he saw that the forest of Phu Khiao had silver and gold and many valuable things, so he took his wife, children and relatives and settled around Phu Khiao and grew rice in Ban Hin. Then birds and wild chickens came and ate his rice. He made nets and caught the birds.

Nai Ma raised wild chickens to use as fighting cocks. Whenever he had a contest with the fowl from other forests he won. He defeated the whole forest. Then Nai Ma took this fighting cock to offer to the king of Vientiane, and he told the king the whole story concerning this cock.

The king’s son took this cock and went around fighting wild cocks and won and got 10,000 in gold. Nai Ma told the whole story and the king of Vientiane before Anou ordered that Nai Ma be given the name Khun Kai and put in charge of the people who collected beeswax and white cloth for the suai tax.

COMMENT: It is uncertain which king ‘before Anou’ (1804–1827) is intended, for a detail below would place these events in early or mid-18th century; but chronology, particularly with respect to events in surrounding states, is not a strong point of this chronicle. It is apparent that the story of Nai Ma and his fighting cock developed as an origin myth to explain the element kai in the 19th-century titles of Phu Khiao governors. The true etymology of kai in this context is from krai, ‘valiant, powerful, large’, showing the regular loss of liquid consonants as second elements of clusters in Lao. Confirmation of this appears in Toem Viphakphocanakit’s book on the history of Isan where governors of Phu Khiao are recorded as holding the title Phraya Krai

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45. These are straight line distances measured from maps. The road distance between Phetchabun and Khon Kaen is 235 km.


47. Pagination will be indicated by 1o, 1r, etc., for 1 obverse, 1 reverse, for as was usual the palm leaves were inscribed on both sides. The first page (page 0) was written on one side only, and unnumbered. Altogether it consists of 8 leaves.

48. Suai was a type of tax in kind imposed on outlying populations. For a concise explanation, see: Hong Lysa, Thailand in the Nineteenth Century, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984, p. 44.
Vickery, *Two Historical Records* - 17

*Sihanat* (‘Lion’ + ‘power’), without any story explaining its origins.\(^{49}\) Indeed that source says Phu Khiao was established as a *mueang* in the reign of King Rama I under a governor entitled *Praya Kraiphakdi*, which, as we shall see, is contrary to the chronicle under study here.\(^{50}\)

(Page 2r) Many years later people from Vientiane emigrated to stay with Khun Kai. According to the census list there were 30,000 people. Khun Kai led the young men to the south to find honey bees, and they found a flintlock gun in a cave where there was a stone lion (*sing*). Khun Kai made offerings and performed rituals, and took this gun (page 3o) and shot rhinoceroses and elephants in the forest and defeated the forest spirits. He got a lot of horns, ivory and wax. Then he went to offer them to the king of Vientiane and the king promoted him to the rank of Pha Kai Sihanat Chao Mueang Phu Khiao.

COMMENT: Here we see the explanatory purpose of the story continuing. The stone lion accounts for the element *siha* (=*sing*) in his titles (see comment above), while the gun represents power, *natha*.\(^{51}\) This bears evidence on the historical value of such chronicles in general. Thus by 1848–1850 local chroniclers in Phu Khiao had no records or knowledge of true titles of local leaders earlier than the first years of the 19th century.

Later on (page 3r) the King of Vientiane divided the realm and gave Pha Kai Sihanat the territory from the Menam Lamphong, from Phu Khi Thao at the source of Nam Phong river; from there down eastward to the Menam Lam Pasi;\(^{52}\) from there across to Khok Khuang and to Ban Kut Luang which is the border with Mueang Suwannaphum. From there to the foot of Khok Luang westward (page 4o) Khok Nong Em Nam San Khok to the Ko rapids on the Nam Lam Si on the border of Mueang Nakhon Latasasima [Ratchasima]; then along the Lam Si westward to the mouth of Huai Lam Siam Tha Tok; along the Nam Lam Siang westward, across Mt. Khok, then to the Huai Ruak which was the boundary of Mueang Visian and on the west was the boundary with Mueang Phetsabun : (page 4r) from the Phya Pho pass to the summit of Bo Thong Khoko following the ridge of the Phu Khiao mountains northward to the Hin Co pass; leave it along the Huai Duk to Phu Kading to source of the stream, and on the west side is the boundary of Mueang Lomsak. On the east is Mueang Phu Khiao.

COMMENT: Note the assumption that Vientiane ruled over much of what is now the Thai Isan. These boundaries outline a large irregular triangle including most of central Isan. The Nam Phong river flows southeastward from a source in Loei into Khon Kaen Province where it joins the Chi/Si river. Then the line continues, apparently along the Chi/Si to some place close to Suwannaphum, then westward to Nakhon Ratchasima, then northward to Phetchabun and Lomsak, close to the area where the source of the Nam Phong should be located. Although the places named between Suwannaphum and Nakhon Ratchasima are not found on available maps, the trace of Phu Khiao’s southern boundary north of the Mul/Mun River is suggested by the absence of any mention of the Mul, and by the location of the western end of that boundary near the upper reaches of


\(^{50}\) Toem, *History of Isan*, pp. 28–29.

\(^{51}\) Below he is also called Pha Kai Singhanat.

\(^{52}\) The Pasi apparently means the river Chi, pronounced */sii/ in Lao.
the Chi to the north of Nakhon Ratchasima. See Map 1.53

Much later Burma destroyed Mueang Phu Khiao and broke it all up. (Page 50) This was when Chao Fa Dok Duea was ruling Siam, but the natives of Phu Khiao of the party of Phya Thep fled and took refuge in Roi Et; Saen Rom took refuge in Suwannaphum; Saen Huk’s party took refuge in Nakhon Latsasima; Pha Kai’s party took refuge in Phetsabun; Khun Phom and the party of Phaya Nai Namvongsa took refuge in Mueang Vientiane.

COMMENT: This is the detail which confuses the chronology suggested above. It appears to refer to the Burmese invasion which resulted in the destruction of Ayutthaya in 1767. Chao Fa Dok Duea, however, otherwise known as King Utumphorn, ruled only from mid-April to May 1758, whereas both Thai and Burmese sources seem to agree that Burmese campaigns against Ayutthaya, in which Laos was involved, did not begin until 1760.54 The officials who fled were apparently subordinate to Pha Kai Sihanat in Phu Khiao, but I have not found reference to them elsewhere. From then on (page 5r) Phu Khiao was deserted until the reign of Pha Loetla Nophalai and Pha Not Fa Chunlalok went and stole Nang Khiao Khom, younger sister of the Uparat of Mueang Vientiane and made her his queen in Krung Thep. Vientiane and Krung Thep were allies.

COMMENT: Pha Loetla Nophalai was King Rama II of Bangkok (1809–1824), and Pha Not Fa Chunlalok was King Rama I (1782–1809). These titles date the composition of this chronicle as not before 1848, when they were given by King Rama III to his father and grandfather. It is not clear how the writer of this chronicle understood the reign sequence.55 The incident to which reference is made here is the conquest of Vientiane in 1778 by Rama I when he was still a general in King Taksin’s army.

At that time he took a large group of Lao elite to Bangkok, including two royal princes, Nandasen and Anuvong, and a daughter of the Lao king, the Nang Khiao Khom mentioned here. In Sila Viravong’s history she is called Phra Nang Kaeo Nhot Fa Kalyansikasatri; and in Thao Ukham Phomvongsa’s The Lao Past she is entitled Phra Nang Kaeo Not Fa (Chao Ning Khiao Khom). She was sister of both the next kings in Vientiane, Nandasen and Anuvong.56 With respect to her becoming queen in Bangkok,

53. Many of the names are not found on the 1:250,000 maps available to me. A closer search should be made on the 1:50,000 series, which in Thailand is not available to the public.


there seems to be conflation with another event, the marriage of Rama I with a daughter of King Inthavong in 1795. At least the latter is recorded in Bangkok dynastic genealogy as mother of a chao fa princess; and Rama I did not appoint an official queen, although his descendants imputed that rank to his first wife from the time before he became king.  

After the Thai invasion, King Siribunyasan returned to reign in Vientiane until his death a year later. Then Prince Nandasen was sent back from Bangkok to succeed him. This explains the Lao-Thai alliance.  

(Page 60) After that there was an elephant catcher who caught a female white elephant. Anou of Vientiane ordered Thao Nammakhot, son of the old Pha Kai Singhanat, to take this white elephant to Krung Thep and he made Thao Nammakhot the Phaya Kai Singhanat. When Anou fought with Siam and could not win (page 6r) he wanted Phaya Kai Singhanat, Chao Mueang Phu Khiao, to go and negotiate with Krung Thep. Phaya Kai Singhanat refused. Anou executed Phaya Kai Singhanat in Ban Pho, Khwaeng Mueang Vientiane.  

COMMENT: This seems to be an event recorded in the Bangkok chronicles, but with some difference in detail. There, following his defeat in 1827 Chao Anou is said to have retreated to Phu Khiao. He ordered the local Chao Mueang to come to meet him, and when the latter refused Anou had him killed. Then Anou established a new base at Nong Bua Lamphu, about 80 km north of Khon Kaen. No title is given for the Chao Mueang, nor is there any reference to Ban Pho.  

When Anou had been defeated by Krung Thep, Chao Bodindeesa [Bodindecha] came to organize provincial governments. Phaya Thep was made Pha Lakhon Si Bolilak Chao Mueang Khon Kaen; Phaya Saen Rom was made Pha Chanthathet in Nong Kong Kaeo renamed Mueang Sonlabot; Nai Lae of Saen Huk’s party was made Pha Phakdi Chumphon in Ban Nong Pa Thao renamed Mueang Chaiyaphum; Namvongsai was appointed as (page 7r) Pha Sithongsaiya Chao Mueang of Phu Wiang in Long Phu Kati; from Phya Kai Ma’s party they appointed Thao Khanti as Pha Kai Singhanat Chao Muang Phu Khiao thenceforth. The four Mueang, Khon Kaen, Sonlabot, Phu Wiang, and Chaiyaphum were established within the old boundaries of Phu Khiao.  

COMMENT: The reference to this in the Bangkok chronicle seems to be at a date equivalent to 12 January 1837. Phraya Bodindecha was sent to carry out a census in 31 mueang in the northeast, including Khon Kaen, Sonlabot, and Phu Wiang.


but with no mention of Phu Khiao. No record of local officials’ titles is included. The four chiefs of the new mueang mentioned here are the same as those recorded above as having fled from the Burmese in the 1760’s, which means (1) that the chronology is totally confused, (2) the Burmese attack was a later one, such as the great invasion of 1785, although it is not recorded as reaching the Isan, (3) Bodindecha’s organizational trip was earlier, or (4) the two incidents concern successive generations of officials bearing the same titles. Perhaps the mention of Burmese in Phu Khiao is quite mythical, resulting from a later generation explaining a real or imagined decline of their area in terms of warfare which had destroyed adjoining regions and which had become a paradigm for externally caused political collapse.

The borders of Muang Phu Khiao ‘now’ are, on the east, Mt. Phu Meng as the border with Khon Kaen and Sonlabot; in the south (hua non) (page 80) take Phu Phasahong as the boundary with Mueang Chaiyaphum; in the west take the ridge of Mt. Khiao from of Phaya Pho pass [and] Co pass [four syllables incomprehensible] as boundary with Mueang Phetsabun and Mueang Lomsak. The border of Phu Khiao and Phu Wiang is the Nam Soen.60

If any Chao Phaya or Pha Mahakasat [king] in this Sumphuthip (jambudvipa) receives this phongsawadan, let him arrange a festival for his children and grandchildren with full honors. If he does not....[last sentence incomprehensible].

Map of Samneua

Samneua

The second document was catalogued as Phongsawadan Samneua, and was marked ‘701 Hanoi’, indicating that it also had been in the Lao collection of the École Française d’Extême in Hanoi, although it is not included among the manuscripts catalogued by Louis Finot in 1917. It is written in black ink on a scroll of white cloth 22 inches wide and about 4 meters in length with 104 lines of text, and is a grant of authority from the King of

60. Above the Phya Phlo pass was called Phya Pho. The variants may be simply Thai and Lao respectively. Some of these locations do not appear on available maps.
Vientiane to the chief official of Samneua (see illustrations at end).\textsuperscript{61} Michel Lorillard has informed me that there are several more Lao documents of this type in the National Library in Bangkok.

Eventually this document deserves complete transcription and translation with detailed discussion of its linguistic and orthographic features, and geographical details, but that would exceed the purpose and limitations of the present context, and I shall merely indicate the main administrative features and list the locations which it records. The document begins with ‘Royal decree (phra rasa achana) [of] His Majesty (somedet boromyanat boromya bophitra somdet phra pen chao) the king of Chanthaburi (ongkha pen phra yu hua na maha nakhon chanthaburi)’.\textsuperscript{62} The date is at the end, Cunlasakarat 1173, ruang mes year, third month, 13th of the waning moon’, or in, 1811, which means that the King of Vientiane in question was Chao Anou, who had succeeded his brother, Chao Inthavong in 1804.

If it is true that Vientiane only gained control over Houaphan in 1791, as some sources indicate, this document may represent the first attempt to reorganize the area

\textsuperscript{61} The measurements are not absolutely precise, but based on a reconstruction from photographs.

\textsuperscript{62} Chanthaburi was the ancient traditional name of Vientiane (Viang Can[dana], ‘City of Sandalwood’), or, according to another interpretation, named after a legendary hero, Burican. See: Sila Viravong, ‘Viengchan Vannakhadi San [in Lao], vol. 2, no. 3, 1954, pp. 31–39. There is still a third, minor, tradition that the name means ‘City of the Moon’, Candra, also pronounced /can/ in Lao.
Vickery, *Two Historical Records* - 22

This decree was ‘placed on the head’ (*sai hua*) of Phya Sisattha, the *hua phan* (‘chief of a thousand’) of Samneua, Phya Phomvisai, and ‘the 5 *khun mueang* and 3 *khun phong*, in order that they conjointly protect the Buddhist faith, the country (*ban mueang*), population, water resources (*nam nong*), slaves, and buildings in the territory of Taseng Mueang Samneua’.

As is clear from another detail below, the *taseng*, then as now, was a subordinate division of a *mueang*, and Phya Sisattha was chief only of Taseng Samneua, not a Chao Mueang.

The decree grants authority over a carefully delimited territory, with the population in it; but it is the territory which is outlined in detail. Its boundaries are described with reference to natural features, mostly water courses, and in terms of physically moving from one point to another, as ‘go along *huai* [stream] x’, ‘cross *huai* x’, ‘go up Mt. x’, ‘go down to x’. There are 150 such names around an area approximately 75 km from East to West and the same distance North to South with the town of Samneua in the center. It is thus not the entire area known in Thai sources as Hua Mueang Ha Thang Hok, or the modern province of Houaphan, but only one part of it. Within that area 50 population centers and work areas are listed, 28 *ban*, 5 *mueang*, 9 *na* (rice fields), and 7 communities of *phai*, people subject to conscript labor for the government; but there is no reference to numbers of people. Administrative centers are given more emphasis than manpower.

Although only 23 of the names of geographical features, and 4 of the names of population centers can be located on the 1:250,000 map of Samneua, they are sufficient to show that the list circumscribes a roughly circular area. Most of the boundary features are water courses (*huai*, ‘stream’, *nam*, ‘river’, *nong*, ‘pond’, *sop*, ‘confluence’); some of the others are elevations (*pha, phu*), ‘forests’ (*pa*), and ‘districts’ (*kaeo*), and one animal feeding place or saltlick (*pung*, no. 121 below). The list ends with the location at which it began, indicating with certainty that a closed boundary was intended. (Refer to the appendix for a list of the boundary features in the order they occur in the text).


64. The 150 names are in lines six to fifty four of the original text.

65. See: *The Royal Chronicles of Ratanakosin*, Reign III, pp. 148–149, 160–161, for some description of the area at that time. The Muang Soi listed there, for example, appears on the 1:250,000 map outside and to the southeast of the area delimited in the decree.

66. Lao *phai* corresponds to Thai *phrai*.

Following this there is a list of population centers (ban), fields (na), and groups of people (phai) contained within the boundary which had been outlined. Following this are instructions concerning persons who may attempt to flee from their obligations. The officials named in this document ‘should not let the people become confused, scatter and run away anywhere to the south or to the north [...] if any do flee to any ban or mueang, the Phya Hua Phan Samneua [and the other officials] should consult together and send a suitable and reliable thao phaya to bring them back’.

Attention is also given to disciplining minor officials. ‘If the Phya Hua Phan Samneua […] gives orders to the thao khun (ranks) sip (10) roi (100) noi (small) yai (big), [that is ‘officials (thao khun) in charge of 10, or 100, low and high (in rank)’] [...] and any of them are refractory and do not obey, the Phya Hua Phan Samneua, Phya Phomvisai [...] should consult together and determine the appropriate punishment’. In the process the Samneua officials are urged to be fair in their judgements, and not to extort bribes while conducting judicial affairs.

In such matters there was apparently an appeal procedure, for the text continues to the effect that if the parties to a case objected to the judgement of the local authorities, the latter were instructed to take them to the Uparat of the Hua Mueang, that is the deputy of a Chao Mueang, which proves that Taseng Samneua was only a division of a Muang. Then, if the Uparat could not render a suitable judgement, the litigants were to be taken to Phya Titsaras, the Chao Mueang of Mueang Sui [Souei], which may mean that Taseng Samneua was within Mueang Souei. The final stage in the appeal process, if the Governor of Mueang Souei was unsuccessful, lay with the Akha Maha Sena, a chief minister, in Vientiane.68

The relationship with Muang Souei is intriguing, for it is now part of Xieng Khouang Province, as it was already in the reign of Rama III. This document suggests that in 1811 Muang Souei was part of Vientiane, or that Xieng Khouang itself was still in the subordinate relationship to Vientiane which had been established in 1787 by Chao Anou’s elder brother King Nandasen.69

The last set of instructions concerns products which were royal monopolies, forbidden to others, and which had to be delivered entirely to the royal treasury in Vientiane. These included poisonous plants, beeswax, a type of cloth (pha khaeo), rhinoceros horns, ivory, tusks of [male] elephants which had died and short female tusks [khnai] which had fallen out, logs for making pirogues, lac, and various types of resins.70 All other products which were not reserved for the state could be kept and used

68. Note the spelling of the title phyá, with a final short /a/, rather than the etymologically correct /aal/, which was used regularly in the Phu Khiao chronicle, phayā. The origin of this title is Old Mon ban´a, hypercorrected in standard Bangkok Thai to phraya.

69. ‘Now’ in this paragraph refers to the 1960s. According to Lao history, Nandasen had attacked Xieng Khouang because the latter was sending tribute to Vietnam; and he forced Xieng Khouang to send Vientiane half the amount of tribute which was being given to Vietnam. See: Sila Viravong, Phongsawadan Lao, pp. 236–237.

70. It is interesting that for ‘rhinoceros’ this text uses the Khmer term ramas (/romeah/) whereas the Phu Khiao chronicle used the Tai term leet (reet, heet).
locally.

This interesting document seems in fact to be a kind of constitution organizing Samneua both politically and economically. It will repay further study, and should be published in full with a complete annotated translation and with all locations listed in Lao script and indicated on an adequate map.

With respect to the mantra it reflects neither search for new land nor for new people to work surplus land, but an attempt at detailed organization by higher authorities of a delimited administrative area with its population in order to furnish special local products to central authorities.

According to another mantra, seen particularly in Cambodia studies, such detailed central government concern with the minutiae of local organization was foreign to the Khmer, Thai, or Lao, but typically Vietnamese, and which the latter tried to force on their neighbors in times of Vietnamese expansion. In this view leanings toward Vietnam by Lao or Cambodian princes struggling against another hegemonist to the West represent betrayal of national interests. As an example see the treatment of King Ang Chan by Chandler and Mabbett, where there is an unfortunate projection of modern chauvinism back into the early nineteenth century in the attribution of “the monarchy’s loss of credit” to “the unfortunate choice made by [...] King Chan (r.1806–1834) to resist Siam by seeking countervailing patronage of Vietnam”. It is bad history to treat Chan and the Cambodian aristocrats who preferred to seek patronage from Vietnam rather than from Thailand as less patriotic or less competent.71

The Samneua document, issuing from a ruler considered a Lao patriot par excellence, suggests that some elements of “Vietnamization” may have been attractive to Lao and Cambodian courts caught in a pincer between larger neighbors, and that this behavior in no way signifies in itself a lack of national sentiment (assuming that such existed in those times).72

Appendix:

72. On Chao Anou, see: Ngaosyvath, Chao Anou. Of course raising the issues of patriotism and national sentiment immediately recalls other mantra, which cannot be discussed here.
MICHAEL VICKERY

TRANSCRIPTION OF NAMES OF PEOPLE AND OCCURING IN THE TWO CHRONICLES

In the text the editors have chosen for the Lao terminology a type of ad hoc roughly approximate phonetic transcription similar to what has often been used for writing about Lao in the English-language academic milieu. For readers with some knowledge of Lao and/or Thai and some understanding of linguistics I attach below a list of the Lao terminology marked to enable them to restore the original Lao spellings. Since there has never been unity about transcription, even among specialists, I have arbitrarily adapted the most widely used systems in ways which I believe will be helpful.73

Thus I have underlined in transcription all low class consonants ('à, è, ù, û) which need to be distinguished from phonetically identical high class (à, è, ù, û), thus: kh, s, th, ph, f, in contrast to kh, s th, ph, f. Historically, the Lao consonants è (graph s) and à (graph e) do not form a pair although they are respectively low and high class. Lao è/s corresponds to both standard Thai so so (s) and cho chang (s).74 In Lao there is no high-class /ch/ (Thai s). Double slashes around a letter, as /s/, mean phonetic transcription, either in normal or phonetic script. Italics in script indicates graphic/Indological transliteration of Lao script. The vowel ai represents mai muan (ɔ) and m represents final /m/ written as a small circle over a vowel symbol, as (ɔ), ì. Further conventions are e = ə, ee = ə, ò = ɔ, ɔ = medial and final a (ɔ/). In open syllable final position this vowel is represented by a small circle above the consonant (ɔ/bɔ). The graphs à and è indicate those short vowels respectively designated with the sign called mai han akat in Thai; short /a/ is also indicated with a following colon, corresponding to an identical sign in Lao (Thai visarjanì); à, ì, ù are the written long vowels; -ya, -ia, corresponding to the Lao orthography; and the velar and palatal nasals are respectively ng (ŋ, ñ, ñ) and nh (ŋ, ñ, ñ), illustrated successively in Lao script, phonetic script and graphic transliteration. Final /th/ written with è (-s) is transcribed -t(s). Note that written initial r is pronounced /h/ in Lao, and toponyms transcribed here with r may be written with h in other sources, such as maps.

These conventions, however, are not sufficient to indicate all of the obsolete or idiosyncratic spellings in the text, nor the use of conjunct/subscript consonants in ways different from modern Lao, which can only be shown by a rigorous transliteration. That would add to the difficulties of the general reader, and can wait for a full treatment on a later occasion.75
1) From Phongsawadan Phu Khiao

Phu Khiao
Nai Ma
Ban Kaluem
Mueang Phan
Khwaeng Mueang Vientiane
Ban Hin
Phraya Krai Sihanat
Praya Kraiphakdi
Pha Kai Sihanat Chao Mueang Phu Khiao
Siha
Natha
Phu Khi Thao
Nam Phong
Menam Lam Pasi
Khok Khuang
Ban Kut Luang
Khok Luang
Khok Nong Em Nam San Khok
Ko rapids
Huai Lam Siang Tha Tok
Nam Lam Siang
Mt. Khok
Huai Ruak
Mueang Visian
Mueang Phetsabun
Phya Pho Pass
Bo Thong Kholo
Hin Cho Pass
Huai Duk
Phu Kading
Chao Fa Dok Duea
Phaya Thep
Saen Rom
Saen Huk
Khun Phom
Phaya Namvongsa
Pha Loetla Nophalai
Pha Not Fa Chunlalok
Nang Khiao Khom
Phra Nang Kaeo Nhot Fa Kilyanisrikasatri

Phū Khiau
Nāy Mā
Bān Kaleum
Mōang Phān
Khveeng Mōang Vientiane
Bān Hin
Phraya Krai Sīhānāth
Praya Kraiphakdi
Pha: Kai Sīhanāt Cau Mōang Phū Khiau
Sīhā
Nātha
Phū Khī Thau
Nām [xx] Phńng
Menam Lām [xx] Pa šī
Khök Khuang
Bān Kut Hluong
Khök Hluong
Khök Nong Em Nam [xx] Sán Khök
Kō rapids
Huay Lām [xx] Siang Thā Tok
Nam Lām [xx] Sīang
Mt. Khök
Huay Ruok
Mōang Visien
Mōang Phetsabun
Phyā Pho Pass
Bo Thong Khōlō
Hīn Co: Pass
Huay Duk
Phū Ka:dīng
Cau Fā Dńk Dōa
Phyā Thep
Seen Rōm
Seen Huk
Khun Phōm
Phyā Nāmvgōsā
Phā : Loṭhńā Nophńlāi
Phā: Nhńt Fá Chunlālōk
Nāng Khiąu Khöm
Phra Nāng Kew Nńht Fá Kǐlyanīśrīkā:šītī

73. In addition to the standard dictionaries of Lao, the Dr. Preecha Phintong, Isan-Thai-English Dictionary [in Thai], Ubolratchadhani: Siritham Press, 1989, has been of great help.
Chao Nhin Khiao Khom Cau Nhin Khiau Khôm
King Intavong King Intavong
King Siribunyasan King Sirībunyasān
Thao Nammakhot Thāv Nāmma:khōt
Ban Pho Bān Phō
Chao Bodindesa/Phya Bodindecha Chao Bodīndesa/Phra:yā Bodindechā
Pha Lakhon Si Boilik Chao Mueang Khon Kaen Pha: Lākhon Si Bōilik Cau
Mōang Khonkaen
Pha Chanathathet Pha: Chānṭha:thet
Nong Kong Kaeo Nòng Kong Keev
Nai Lai Nāy Lee
Pha Phakdi Chumphon Pha: Phākdi Chumphon
Ban Nong Pa Phao Bān Nāng Pā Thāu
Namvongsā Nāmvongsā
Pha Sithongsaiya Pha: Sithongsaiya:
Long Phu Kati Lòng Phū Kāṭī
Thao Khanti Thāu Khįntī
Mt Phu Meng Mt Phū Meng
Phu Phasahong Phū Phā:sāhōng
Phya Phlo Phyā Phlō
Phya Cho Phyā Co:
Nam Soen Nām Sōn

2) From Phongsawadan Samneua

phra rasa achana phra rāsa āchnā
somdet boromyanat boromya bophitra somdet phra pen chao
Somdek boromyanāṭh boromya bophitra somdec phraːː pėn cǎu
ongkha pen phra yu hua nai maha nakhon chanthaburi
ongkhaː pēn phraː yū hua nāː māː hāː nāː khāː rāː cīnthāː būrī
Chanthaburi Cándapuri
Phaya Sisattha Phyā Sīsatthā
Hua Phan Hua Phān
Phaya Phomvisai Phyā Phomvīsāi
Khun Phong Khun Phōng
Nam Nong Nam [xx] Hnōng
Mueang Sui Mōang Suy
Pung Pūng
Akha Maha Sena Ákhaː māːhāsenā

3) The boundary features in the order they occur in Phongsawasan Samneua

kee v ē p hōː mōː nā dōn (1), huay khuː mūn (2), hua phū khā (3), phāː sing (4), kēe v
deen mōːang fōːŋ (5), phāː ārōng (6), phūː ʂāu (7), phāː ārīn (8), cīk pāː pēek (9), huay ā
rīn (10), huay trāːbūan (11), huay sāːt (12), liːn phāː nāŋ (13), thām kō kēe v bōː hōː (14),
huay rāː (15), phāː suak (16), cīk pāː pēek (17), suan tāː (18), phāː teŋŋ lāː yāː kāːy (19), kēe v
phāː kōː bōː (20), cīk pāː ǒːn (21), huay phāː thōːng (22), huay kāːsāː (23), sōp huay trāːkhōːn
(24), huay kraːsōːŋ (25), nāːm nhōː kʰōː (26), phūː fōːŋ (27), pāː kʰēːk (28), pāː kʰōːn
(29), huay māː t (30), kēe v nhōːm (31), pāː huay phāː kūːng (32), huay pāː hāː kǔː t (33),
kee v phūː liːn tāːŋ (34), huay cǎːkōː nōy (35), huay thūːm (36), nāːm ɛːt (37), sōp’í (38), nā
mǐ (39), huay sa:mū: (40), pā têt(s) (41), phū bèt(s) (42), keev lhông (43), thông ta:đunj (44), pak năm sai (45), hua phū hmák fōng (46), họng nh燠 (47), phā nōk ngçek (48), huay yeen (49), phū lìam (50), keev dêt(s) dēng (51), phū ceeng (52), phū syang rai năm yoy kho:y phū pêng khet (53), phāk huay t'ai sán (54), nhōt(s) ceeng pêng khet (55), phū lin kōng (56), huay sngón (57), năm sa:neen (58), sop sngōt(s) (60), dān ngōak (61), năm ceek (62), sop lāk (63), phū kēng (64), năm yoy kho:y phū pêng khet (65), keev sīk hnh phā (66), huay 3 līn (67), năm tōang (68), huay kḥang ngua hūa din pêng khet (69), keev sōm bo lōng (70), năm lōn (71), sop dēng (72), sān huăng (73), phā deeng (74), mai khrōn 3 sum (75), keev rahu (76), sop huay phān dōn (77), sop huay nām theen (78), keev līn lāng (79), keev pā khōm nōy (80), huay phā thōng (81), phā hmōk (82), họng boy hông bōt (83), pā hōk (84), pā ćā (85), pā ree (86), hōk tham din (87), phā mōk phā boy (88), pā hōm nhōng (89), huay rvā (90), nām pān (91), huay kōa (92), keev kōa (93), huay sāy (94), huay nā sī (95), huay hmōat(s) (96), sop huay sālā (97), huay din deeng (98), ...khu:n sūt nhōt(s) (99), huay kīv kho hmā (100), nhōt(s) huay cā (101), nām hmōat(s) (102), nām pān (103), sop nām pān nām mōng pā keeng tō kān (104), keeng hōt(s) (105), nā thyang fā (106), huay sāt(s) (107), pāk kḥāng 3 tōn (108), keev 3 pōm hnh thām (109), nām pōn (110), kḥāng fōng (111), phā deeng (112), līn sōa (113), keev thām sūm (114), hūa kḥāng hāng nā fā līn ān (115), sop huay hāk (116), huay tōng (117), nā rā tāi (118), phū luāng (119), huay sāy khāv (120), pūng khyat (121), nām āng (122), nām sām (123), huay syak (124), keev yān pān (125), phū skēng kveeng (126), huay tām (127), phū ngām sā ng (128), huay cā (129), nām vēen (130), sop sōy (131), sān kō (132), then westward (133), phā būt (134), huay pā pong (135), huay dōng (136), sop huay ngū hāu (137), huay hńng deeng (138), huay pyat (139), huay phūk pēng khet(s) (140), pā sādai (141), huay op (142), huay āy (143), nām pōn (144), huay mān (145), keev hnh/hān (146), keev cī (147), huay sōng (148) hńng 3 tāng (149), huay sādā (150), sī nāhv (151), keev rān hōm pōm nā dōng (1).

The list ends with the location at which it began, indicating with certainty that a closed boundary was intended. The names found on the modern 1:250,000 map,74 and marked with their numbers on Map 2, are: huay sāt (12), huay rāv (15), marked on the map by Bān Hūe Hāo and Phū Hūe Hāo, phā suak (16), shown as Phoou Souak on the map, huay māt (33), huay pāttāt (33), huay cākō (35), assuming that this name on the map is the same stream, or a branch, as the huay cākō noy of the list, nām eet (38), assuming that it is the same as the Nam Het of the map, which fits the relative location in terms of other names, sop tā (39), unmarked, but obviously the confluence of the Y River with the Het, nām tā (Y) (40), phū līam (51), shown as Pha Liem, huay sōng (58), marked by Bān Sanone, nām sa:neen (59), nām lōn (71), nām pān (91), huay cā (101), marked by Bān Ca nām pān (103), sop (confluence) of the nām pān with the nām mōng pā keeng (104), assuming that this is the confluence of the Nam Pan with the Nam Keng shown on the map, nām sām (123), huay cā (129), nā vēen (130), nām pōn (144), huay mān (145), huay sōng (148).

74. The map used and reproduced in part as Map 2 below is ‘Samneua’, Edition 1-AMS, Sheet NF 48-14, printed by Service Géographique Nationale, Vientiane, 2.1963.
4) Population centers, fields (na), and groups of people contained within the boundary outlined in Phongsawadan Samneua

bān rām hluang (1), bān rām noy (2), bān rām kāng (3), bān kō (4), bān yòng tāi (5), bān yòng hluang (6), bān ngā kāng (7), bān sōng tāi (8), bān sōng nā (9), bān sī neen (10), bān n hūyā (11), bān sai (12), bān hūa sīang (13), bān kōt(s) (14), bān kāng (15), bān tōang (16), möang khān (17), bān yāt (18), bān lyan (19), bān tām (20), bān sā kāng (21), bān mōang sān (22), bān yāt (23), bān tām (24), bān nā thōng (25), bān dōn (26), bān lōng kēhā nā yōng (27), bān muan tāi (28), bān muan hluang (29), mōang veen (30), mōang và (31), mōang lān (32), moang sūn (33), phái seen khau thau mōang nūng (34), phái hō kāng mōang nūng (35), phái phāk (36), phái hluang sō phyā (37), phái bān kōat(s) (38), phái phông (39), phái nā fākhāk hua phān sāmnoa (40), nā seen khau thau mōang nūng (41), nā hluang (42), nā yòng hluang (43), nā dōn (44), nā bān muan nā tāi (45), nā muan hluang (46), nā bān kēhōng (47), nā phông noy (48), nā phông hluang (49), nā hō (50).

Among the seven groups of phái (nos. 33–39), no. 35 is ‘the mōang of phái of the central palace (hō kāng), probably indicating the governor’s establishment in Samneua town; no. 37 is also attached to central authority (phái hluang) and seems to be located at the confluence (sōp) of a water course named phyā; and no. 40 refers to both people and fields (nā) attached to Hua Phan Samneua. Among the list of fields (nā), no. 42, hluang (royal), and no. 50, hō (palace), belong to central authorities, while others are the fields of bān which have already been listed: nā yòng (43)bān yòng (5–6), nā dōn (44)/bān dōn (26), nā muan (45–46)/bān muan (28–29). Numbers 34 and 41, the phái, and the nā of seen khau thau mōang are obviously linked too; and probably 'seen khau thau mōang' (one hundred thousand/rice/elder/ [of] mōang') is the title of a local notable.75

Few of the population centers or fields can be located. Those identifiable, and marked on Map 2 with their numbers underlined, are bān yòng (5–6), about 15 km northwest of Samneua town, bān hūa sīang (13), 37 km southwest, bān nā thōng (25), just to the east, and bān muan (28, 29), about 7 km to the north.